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KENTUCKY LAW JouNA.
"TRAUMATIC INJURY" UNDER THE KENTUCKY WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
Section 1 of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act
provides:
"It [the act] shall effect the liability of the employers
subject thereto to their employes for a personal injury
sustained by the employe by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment, or for death resulting
from such accidental injury; provided, however, that
'personal injury by accident' as herein defined shall not
include diseases except where the disease is the natural
and direct result of a traumatic injury by accident, nor
shall it include the results of a preexisting disease, but
shall include injury or death due to inhalation in mines
of noxious gases or smoke, commonly known as "bad air,"
and also shall include injuries or death due, to the in-
halation of any kind of gas and to the disease of silicosis."'
In the case of The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton,"
the plaintiff, Sexton, was working at the job of skinning and dressing
rabbits. He had a cut on his hand which he had received while
chopping wood at home, and by reason of such cut and by coming
in contact with a diseased rabbit, he contracted tularemia. He was
allowed compensation by the Kentucky court which said the injury
was the natural and direct result of a "traumatic injury by accident."
The court further stated that the injury was suffered in the course
of employment, unexpectedly and without design, and was traceable
to a definite time, place, and cause.
The same court in the same year denied compensation in the case
of Mills v. Columbia Gas Construction Company.' There the ap-
plicant was working ,in the country away from normal habitation,
laying a gas line. Because of the scarcity of water the company
furnished water to the men. Since some of the water was con-
taminated the plaintiff caught typhoid fever. Compensation was not
allowed, the court deciding that typhoid fever was not a compensable
injury, since Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.005 specifically ex-
cludes diseases of all character except where the disease is itself a
natural and direct result of a traumatic injury, while typhoid fever
results from the absorption of typhoid bacilli into the system through
the normal channels of entry.
It may be questioned whether these two cases can be reconciled.
Insofar as the two diseases are concerned, both are bacterial dis-
eases." Tularemia will show its symptoms in from three to ten
-KY. R. S. (1946) 342.005.
1242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W. 2d 87 (1932).
1246 Ky. 464, 55 S.W. 2d 394 (1932).
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days and may be acquired by a bite from a diseased tick or fly,
eating insufficiently cooked diseased meat, or an infection through
the skin. The tularemia bacilli are distributed throughout the body
in the blood and cause an involvement of the lymph-glands and
occasional suppuration. The general features are chills, with high
fever, general weaknessi an occurrence of conjunctival ulcers and
probable skin eruptions.
As to typhoid fever, the authorities state that the disease is
acquired by swallowing the infecting organisms and is spread by
direct or indirect contact with the sources of infection with the
bacilli being in the circulating blood in all cases in its early stages.
The incubation period averages from ten to fourteen days and notice-
able enlargement of the spleen, degeneration of the liver, and other
body changes occur.
There are several questions that arise, the answers to which
must be compared before the two cases can be adequately con-
trasted. The first question is whether the two cases can be ade-
quately differentiated so as to reach a different result solely on the
difference in modes of entry of the bacilli into the bodies of the
claimants. It is submitted that it is not logical to argue that en-
trance through a pre-existing artificial cut on the skin is a "trau-
matic injury" while entry through a natural opening is not. The
scratch on the skin is merely a conduit for an entry of disease
germs into the body and to hold that the passage of germs into the
body by a pre-existing scratch, which produces a disease, is a
"traumatic injury" while not to hold a similiar entry through a
normal channel of entry is a "traumatic injury" seems strained and
unnatural. Since in the Sexton Case the claimant had scratched his
hand prior to the time of his cleaning the rabbits it is evident that
the "traumatic injury" occurred not at the time of entry into the
body but subsequent thereto. In the one case the germ entered
through the mouth and in the other case the germ entered through
a pre-existing cut, so, since neither can be a "traumatic injury," as
to the mode of entry into the body, a second question is presented.
This second question is whether on these facts either or both
of the diseases were the result of a "traumatic injury," within the
meaning of the phrase as used in the Kentucky Statute. The term
"traumatic injury" which is used in the Kentucky Workmen's Com-
pensation Act has long and often caused trouble as to its interpreta-
tion and meaning. It is derived from the word "trauma" which
Webster defines as: "an injury, or wound, or the resulting condi-
tion." As used in the Compensation Act the court has held it to
be limited to an external injury but a study of the word will show
that it goes further than that and may include internal force as well.
In the various definitions made of che word no mention is made of
the word "external," and too it has other meanings in other fields.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word "trauma"
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in the field of psychiatry as being "a mental shock; a disturbing
influence to which a neurosis may be traced." In the Kentucky Act
itself-Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec. 342.005-no mention is made
of the word "external.' Thus, it would seem that the term "trau-
matic injury" should not be made to mean only an external force or
blow but may cover an internal shock or blow as well.
Let us suppose the following .hypothetical situation: A and B
are employes of C in C's paint store. They are working in the base-
ment when a fire breaks out and spreads rapidly. In order to
escape up the stairs they must go through a high and intense wall
of flame. A in escaping receives severe burns on the hands and
face. B, wearing gloves and partially covering his face, follows A
out but being terror stricken fails to hold his breath and breathes
flame-ridden air into his lungs. Externally B is burned only about
one section of his face but as a result of breathing the flames his
mouth, throat, and part of his lungs are seared which later develops
into pulmonary edema and he dies from "drowning."
Under the above situation there is little doubt but that A re-
ceived a "traumatic injury by accident," but would the fatal injury
of B be compensable? It is submitted that it would be even though
the death was caused by an internal traumatic blow. The effect of
excessive heat against the body has already been classified as a
traumatic injury in the case of Wolfe v. American Rolling Mill Com-
pany.' Here the deceased was slagging molten metal within a few
feet of molds of liquid steel. He became ill of heatstroke and died
'a short time later. The court called his death a personal injury by
accident. Too, in the case of Hoosier Engineering Company v. Sparks'
the claimant worked for a company which was constructing a high
voltage power line. Claimant and others had been cutting brush
on the right of way and claimant, in the afternoon, started and tend-
ed a brush fire. He became overheated and then unconscious, re-
maining so until the next morning. He was confined to his room
for nearly a month. Here the court held that his injury was com-
pensable notwithstanding his skin was neither burned nor blistered.
Thus, it would seem that the force of heat on any part of the body
could be classified as a traumatic injury and it would not matter if
the heat were internal before its devastating force first started to
work. Then, if the foregoing be true, is it any different from the
case of Mills v. Columbia Gas Construction Company? In the Mills
Case the claimant swallowed contaminated water, the germs of which
soon caused an enlargement of the spleen, changed various organs,
etc. In the hypothetical case the deceased swallowed flames Which
later led to pulmonary edema and he "drowned." In both cases it
was an accident and in both cases, as a result of an internal force
or blow, the accident caused grievous injury to the employe. It
1277 Ky. 395, 126 S.W. 2d 835 (1939).302 Ky. 375, 194 S.W. 2d 843 (1946).
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would seem the two cases are so closely related as to reach a like
result.
Another issue that should claim comment, while on the subj6ct
of "traumatic injury," is whether a disease caused by a germ can be
classified as an injury. Professor Moreland, of the University of
Kentucky Law School, states: "The decision that some external
physical force actually directed against the body must occur in order
to constitute traumatic injury by accident places a narrow con-
struction on the word 'traumatic.' The impact of a germ upon the
integrity of the claimant's body, a blow which though microscopical-
ly minute, produces an immediate effect, may well be held to be a
traumatic injury."- And, to cite again the Sexton Case where the
claimant was allowed compensation, the court called the mishap of
tularemia which is caused by a germ, a "traumatic injury by
accident."
The third question to be answered is whether either or both of
the diseases can be traced to a definite time, place and cause.
In the case of Lyda Hamilton v. Liggett and Myers Tobacco
Company' the plaintiff contracted a disease of the backs of her hands
and fingers by reason of the performance of her work as a scrub
woman for defendant and her hands coming in contact with the
solutions which she used in such work. The disease developed
gradually over a period of six months when she had to quit work.
The court denied her claim saying that the disease having developed
gradually during the time she was engaged at the work and not
resulting from any external injury it was not a personal or trau-
matic injury by accident as defined in the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
Also, in the case of William Simon v. Louisville Ice and Coal
Storage Company' the court denied plaintiff's claim under the fol-
lowing facts. Plaintiff was employed by defendant as an ice puller.
In removing the cans of ice from the vats, calcium brine dripped on
his shoes and the lower part of his trousers in this way com-
ing in contact with the skin and causing sores and boils to develop
on his right leg. The disability was not the result of any one par-
ticular application of the brine, but was due to a series of applications
during the period of his employment of several weeks. Here the
court denied plaintiff's claim by saying the disability must be the
result of a personal injury and must be traceable to some definite
time and place resulting from some definite cause.
It is evident in the light of these and similar decisions that
where an injury has developed gradually over a period of weeks or
months or where the time of the injury cannot be traced definitely
'Moreland, The General Development of Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts (1925) 13 Ky. L. J. 200 at 206.
'4 Ky. W. C. B. L. Dec. 147 (1921).
'4 Ky. W. C. B. L. Dec. 190 (1921).
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there cannot be a recovery on the part of the plaintiff. In these
cases the result has not been reached by any one injury but because
of the application of an aggravation of numerous forces or blows
over a period of time. In the Lyda Hamilton Case the first time she
dipped her hands in the strong solution there was a slight injury
but neither noticeable nor harmful. However, the constant dipping
in the solution for a period of six months finally caused grievous
harm, but in no wise could any one application be called the true
blow that caused the injury. It was the application of the whole
that caused the disease.
However, in the Sexton Case the court reached a conclusion
that the time and place of the force of the germs against Sexton's
skin could be found. It occurred when he was dressing the rabbits
and the cause was the germs from these diseased rabbits.
It is submitted that the court could have reached a like result
in the Mills Case. The disease was not the result of numerous ap-
plications or blows but was the result of drinking contaminated
water by the claimant at a particular time. It was not an aggrava-
tion of a force against the body over a period of time but was due
to the injurious application made when he drank the water. It can-
not be likened to the numerous aggravated cases which lingered on
for periods of weeks or months before the disease caused the person
to be incapacitated, because here the claimant cannot be said to
have drunk the water for ten days before he became ill. It was the
company's accidental mishap that caused his disease.
As earlier related, the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act
expressly forbids compensation for disease unless such disease is the
natural and direct result of a traumatic injury by accident. How-
ever, the word "traumatic" has been held not to be limited to a
physical force or blow in the sense of terms which imply power,
vigor, or violence. The Court of Appeals has held as in the Sexton
Case and in the Sparks Case that any independent influence or
cause coming into contact with the body and causing injury to the
physical structure thereof may be classified as a traumatic injury.
The fourth question is whether either or both of the diseases
were the result of an accident. Webster's New International
Dictionary defines the word "accident" as being... "an event that
takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned,
sudden, and unexpected event; an undesigned and unforeseen oc-
currence of an afflictive or unfortunate character; an unexpected
happening not due to any negligence or malfeasance of the party
concerned." The Kentucky Court of Appeals has already decided
that under the facts of the Sexton Case tularemia as a disease is
an accident. At the same time it is the writer's belief that in the
case of Mills v. Columbia Gas Construction Company typhoid fever
as a disease was an accident as used within the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. Mills was in the course of his employment when
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he came in contact with the contaminated water. The water, be-
cause of its scarcity in the vicinity, was being provided by the com-
pany solely for the use of the employes who had no chance to
provide their own. The claimant, as did all the other employes,
used the water so provided and it cannot be said he was lax or
negligent in so doing. The contamination of the water was unfore-
seen and unexpected. It was not caused by any negligence or
malfeasance on the part of Mills, but rather was caused by the very
nature and geographical location of the work being done. It was an
unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive character as used in the
definition of "accident." Surely the action of the typhoid germs
on the integrity of the employe's body is as much an accident as the
similiar action of the tularemia germs, where in both cases the em-
ployer had no knowledge of the nature of his act and in both cases
the germs so placed subsequently diseased the employes.
From the foregoing cases and comments it would seem that the
two cases at issue cannot be adequately differentiated. In the one
case the germs entered the body through a normal channel and in
the other the germs entered through a pre-existing cut, and both
can be said to be "traumatic injuries." If the force of a tularemia
germ is a "trauma," then the force of a typhoid germ is a "trauma."
If the Sexton Case was an accident in the course of employment,
there is no reason why the Mills Case should not be an accident in
the course of employment. If the disease of tularemia can be traced
to a definite time, place, and cause, then the disease of typhoid
fever can be traced to a definite time, place, and cause. It is the
writer's belief that the Mills Case should have been decided the same
way as the Sexton Case for it was a disease which was the natural
and direct result of a traumatic injury by accident as defined by the
Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act and should be compensable.
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